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I. INTRODUCTION
The international nature of modern commercial activity gives
rise to an array of international business crimes.' Consequently, off-
shore banking facilities are frequently used as a conduit for channel-
ing illegal profits.2 Efforts by United States federal courts to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign bank accounts is the source of
considerable conflict. Viewing these expansive jurisdictional attempts
as an invasion of their sovereign rights, foreign governments enact
legislation to counter United States efforts,3 often creating a jurisdic-
1. A report from the House Committee on Banking and Currency stated that secret
foreign bank accounts permit a proliferation of "white collar" crimes. H.R. REP. No. 975,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970). Examples of this type of international "white collar" crime
include: violation of United States antitrust laws, securities fraud (insider trading), evasion of
income taxes, and the laundering of money from narcotics smuggling. See infra notes 103-107
and accompanying text.
2. H.R. REP. No. 907, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984). "[A]Imost any kind of
international crime, if it has the goals of profit, continuing operations, and avoidance of
detection and prosecution, will run a critical phase of its business through the offshore haven
bank, trust, and company system .. " R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUST, AND
COMPANIES at xiii (1984).
3. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, Austl. Acts
No. 121, amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act,
1976, Austl. Acts No. 202, repealed and replaced by Foreign Proceedings (Excess of
Jurisdiction) Act, '1984, Austl. Acts No. 3 (Austl.); Uranium Information Security
Regulations, CAN. CONS. REGS. ch. 366 (1978), implementing the Atomic Control Act, R.S.C.
ch. A-19 (1970). Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Can. Stat. ch. 49 (1984) (Can.);
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tional deadlock, whereby the subject of the proceeding is forced to
choose which forum to obey.
This Comment examines the implications of compelling the pro-
duction of evidence from a foreign state under the grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum.' It will focus specifically on the subpoena
directed at a nonparty witness, namely, the bank.5 Branches of mul-
tinational banks6 "doing business" in the United States must abide by
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976) and the Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) (Amendment) Law, 1979 (Law 26 of 1979) (Cayman Islands);
Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, Relating to the Transmission of Documents and Information
To Foreign Authorities in the Area of Maritime Trade, J.O. 7267, D.S.L. 248 (Fr.); Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964, ch. 87 (Gr. Brit.). For a further discussion
of foreign legislation, see infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
4. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the issuance of subpoenas
in criminal cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. A subpoena duces tecum is issued to ensure the
production of evidence. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1973). The procedure
for issuing a subpoena duces tecum is outlined in Rule 17(c). FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). It states:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on
motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would
be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers,
documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at
a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in
evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or
objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
Id.
The forcefulness of the subpoena duces tecum can be witnessed in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1973). Pursuant to Rule 17(c), a subpoena was issued upon President Nixon to
produce certain tape recordings and documents. Id. at 686. The President, claiming executive
privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. Id. The Supreme Court compelled the pro-
duction of the tapes and documents stating: "The need to develop all relevant facts in the
adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts." Id. at 709.
Once the court has jurisdiction over a party, it may order the production of evidence from
a witness in a foreign country through a subpoena duces tecum. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982). See
infra note 81.
5. Questions of personal jurisdiction through service of process over a party will not be
addressed in this Comment.
6. This Comment will focus on both foreign-owned banks with branches in the United
States and banks registered in the United States with branches in a foreign state. It will not
discuss the situation presented by a foreign state requesting documents from a United States
bank. In such a case the foreign country must follow the procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
1782 (1982). A recent Eleventh Circuit decision, In re Request For Assistance From Ministry of
Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago ("Trinidad"), addressed a subpoena issued under the
authority of section 1782. In re Request For Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988). In Trinidad, the Minister of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago asked the United States Attorney General to help obtain the
bank records of one of its nationals from a Florida bank. Id. at 1152. The Minister sought the
records in connection with an investigation of Trinidad and Tobago nationals involved in
violations of the Exchange Control Act. Id. The Department of Justice, under Section 1782,
moved the district court to issue the subpoena for the bank records. Id. The district court
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the laws of this jurisdiction.7 Thus, when served with a subpoena, the
bank must comply with the order or face a contempt of court charge.
Problems arise, however, when the subpoenaed documents are in a
foreign jurisdiction that enacts legislation making it a crime to dis-
close any banking information. The bank is then faced with the
choice of violating either a court order or a foreign nondisclosure
law. 9
The federal courts considering the issue have failed to develop a
common doctrinal method to balance the interests of the conflicting
jurisdictions. Some courts follow the test established by the only deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States to face the issue,
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, ' 0 while others apply the Restatement
of Foreign Relations, I" or develop their own method of analysis.
12
Societe Internationale establishes a good faith standard to measure the
validity of the extraterritorial jurisdiction, while the Restatement of
granted the subpoena and the customer moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that
section 1782 requires a proceeding to be pending in the foreign country. Id. The court denied
the motion concluding that under Section 1782, the requested documents were "for use in a
foreign tribunal." In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad
and Tobago, 648 F. Supp. 464, 467 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, affirmed. 848 F.2d at 1156. Analyzing
the history of Section 1782, the court determined that Section 1782 reflects a congressional
desire to increase the power of the district court to respond to requests for international
assistance. Id. at 1154. The court further concluded that the records are discoverable under
the laws of Trinidad and Tobago, thus enhancing the vitality of the subpoena. Id. at 1156. It
cautioned, however, that courts should not decide whether the evidence would be admissible in
the foreign court. Id. It is noteworthy that a foreign country is generally required to adhere to
the statute when requesting documents, while United States courts, when issuing subpoenas
directed at foreign banks, usually refuse to follow any such requirement.
7. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). An individual who purposefully
avails himself of conducting activities within a jurisdiction is subject to the benefits and the
burdens of its laws. Id.
8. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) states: "Failure by any person without
adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court
from which the subpoena issued .... " FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
9. See generally Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320 (1983); Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign
Jurisdiction Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295 (1962); Note,
Jurisdiction-Limitation of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 20 VA. J. INT'L. L. 925 (1980); Note,
Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE
L.J. 612 (1979).
10. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
11. The Restatement of Foreign Relations is not law, but the opinion of the American Law
Institute (ALl). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS at IX (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The ALI is a a private organization, not affiliated with the United
States government or any of its agencies. Id. The Restatement is "in no sense an official
document of the United States." Id. It may be persuasive, however, in jurisdictions where
there is no established law.
12. See infra Section IV.
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Foreign Relations provides a factor analysis. Among the various
approaches applied by the United States Courts of Appeals, of pri-
mary importance is the analysis developed by the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
employs judicial restraint when compelling the production of docu-
ments, thus reflecting its awareness of the hardship imposed on the
non-party witness and the international implications of exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 13 This approach requires a close exami-
nation of the foreign law, and a showing that the foreign law prohibits
disclosure, before the non-party bank is excused from production.
The evolution of a strong national interest to adjudicate international
criminal activity, however, seems to influence the majority of circuits
of the United States Courts of Appeals to require disclosure without
regard to the international concerns mentioned by the Second Cir-
cuit.14 Only recently, in a decision from the United States Court of
13. See infra notes 172-212 and accompanying text.
14. This Comment will focus solely on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
course of a criminal investigation, as opposed to civil litigation. In certain instances, however,
it may be necessary to discuss civil case law as a tool of comparison. The exercise of a broad
discovery power in civil matters has also caused much controversy. Primary disputes arose in
response to the differences in the taking of evidence between common law and civil law
countries. See Compagnie Francaise v. Phillips Petroleum Comp., 105 F.R.D. 16, 25-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Neither the defense of privilege nor French law shielded the plaintiffs from
discovery of documents within their control.). For a brief discussion on the differences
between civil and common law, see infra note 82.
In an attempt to solve these problems, the Multilateral Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters was adopted. Multilateral Convention on
the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970. 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention is presently in
force among Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Offices of the Legal Advisor, United States Dept.
of State, Treaties in Force 261-62 (1986). The convention prescribes certain procedures for
litigants in one contracting State to obtain evidence in another contracting State. Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court For The S. Dist. of Iowa, 107
S. Ct. 2542, 2545 (1987). As stated in the recent Aerospatiale decision, "the Hague Convention
[does] not deprive [a] District Court of the jurisdiction it otherwise possesse[s] to order a
foreign national party before it to produce evidence physically located within a signatory
nation." Id. at 2553.
In Aerospatiale, the court found that the procedures of the Convention are not mandatory,
but that courts should exercise care in addressing any special problem confronted by the
foreign litigant and should consider any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state. Id. at
2557. It refused, however, to articulate any rules to guide the lower courts. Id. Compare
Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (Blackmun, J, dissenting) ("The Court ignores the
importance of the Convention by relegating it to an 'optional' status, without acknowledging
the significant achievement in accommodating divergent interests that the Convention
represents.") with In re Anschuetz and Co., 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S.
Ct. 3223 (1987) (The Hague Convention does not supplant application of discovery provisions
of the federal rules over foreign, Hague Convention state nationals subject to in personam
jurisdiction in a United States court.); Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519 (1984) (It
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Appeals for the District of Columbia, In re Sealed," did a court once
again recognize the implications of imposing our discovery laws on
foreign states.
Section II of this Comment discusses the In re Sealed decision in
order to present the main issues posed by the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. Section III analyzes how exercising jurisdiction in
this manner infringes upon sovereign and due process rights. The
analysis of sovereignty involves a general discussion of international
law and the various concerns United States courts should address
when entering the territory of another state. The due process discus-
sion focuses on the specific interests that are in conflict: the interests
of the United States in grand jury investigations, the foreign interests
in enacting nondisclosure laws, and the individual (the bank) subject
to the proceeding. This analysis establishes the foundation to later
examine the developing judicial doctrines. Section IV discusses the
inconsistent methodology that has shaped the judicial doctrine by
examining the Supreme Court's decision in Societe Internationale and
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. It will then analyze the
various methods developed by courts attempting to resolve the con-
flict. Finally, the Comment concludes with a proposal for a uniform
analysis among the circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF IN RE SEALED
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in a case of first impression, recently considered the conflicting
national interests and foreign state interests in the context of grand
jury subpoenas issued in the face of foreign banking secrecy laws. In
re Sealed 16 involved a branch of a worldwide bank, owned by country
X,17 "doing business" in the United States. 8 During a grand jury
investigation of an alleged scheme by a number of United States citi-
zens to launder money, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum to
is a mistake to view the convention as an international agreement to protect foreign nationals
from discovery procedures in the United States when they are parties before United States
courts.). For a more extensive discussion of foreign discovery matters in civil litigation and the
Hague Convention, see S. SEIDEL, EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION 248 (1984); Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of
Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 733 (1983).
15. 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
16. Id
17. The parties in the appeal were not identified in order to maintain the secrecy of the
grand jury proceeding. Id. at 495.
18. Id.
19881
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the bank and its manager. 19 The subpoena sought bank documents
19. Id. The court of appeals was asked to determine the validity of two contempt charges:
one against the bank for failure to produce the requested documents, and the other against the
manager for refusing to give testimony about the target's banking activities. Id. This
Comment will solely examine the issues presented by the subpoena directed at the bank. The
manager, who prepared the documents in Country Y, and who is a citizen of Country X, based
his refusal to testify on fifth amendment and comity grounds. Id. at 496. Specifically, he
claimed that ihe very act of testifying would subject him to criminal sanctions in Country Y,
thus "cloak[ing] his refusal to testify with fifth amendment protection." Id. He refused to
testify even after being granted immunity by the United States government, as he could not be
immunized from criminal prosecution for violating laws of Country Y Id.
The Sealed court did not find it necessary to address the constitutional (fifth amendment)
issue. Relying on the standard established in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of
Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) that the defendant have "a real and substantial fear
prosecution," the District of Columbia court found that the manager's fear was not real
because he could only be prosecuted if he voluntarily returned to Country Y. Id. at 497. It
thus held that, as there was no real fear of prosecution, the fifth amendment was inapplicable.
Id. In the brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the manager argued that this holding would
force him to forgo other constitutional rights-the right to travel and the right to hold and
enjoy property in Country Y. Brief for Petitioner at 23-25, In re Sealed, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 41. See also In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (The fifth amendment does not protect against dangers voluntarily assumed.).
The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether real fear of prosecution in a foreign
country is sufficient to invoke the fifth amendment privilege. Courts that have considered the
issue are divided. Compare United States v. Under Seal, 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986) (the fifth amendment is only applicable if the foreign jurisdiction
has a similar privilege.); Nigro v. U.S., 705 F.2d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 1982) (The secrecy of a
grand jury proceeding is sufficient to eliminate any reasonable concerns a witness may have as
to foreign prosecution.); with In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (Values
expressed by fifth amendment bar compulsion of testimony that could be used in any foreign
prosecution.); Mishima v. U.S., 507 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Alaska 1981) (The fifth amendment
privilege may be validly asserted, but only to specific questions that tend to incriminate.).
In a recent case, Doe v. United States, the Supreme Court did decide the controversial fifth
amendment issue regarding compelled disclosure of foreign bank records. Doe v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988). Pursuant to a subpoena, the target of a federal grand jury
investigation produced some records in foreign banks, but when questioned about the existence
or location of additional bank records, the target invoked his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 2343. The United States branches of the banks were also served with
subpoenas to produce the records. Id. When the banks refused to comply, citing their
government's bank secrecy laws which prohibited disclosure without consent, the government
filed a motion that the court order Doe to sign consent forms. Id. at 2343-44. The district
court denied the motion finding that the forms were not testimonial in nature. Id. at 2344. On
remand, the district court ordered Doe to sign- the consent directives. Id. at 2345. After
refusing, the court held him in civil contempt, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id.
Focusing on the testimonial nature of the form, the Court found that the phraseology in
the consent directive was not testimonial in that it did not relate a factual assertion. Id. at
2350-5 1. Specifically, it viewed the directive as expressing no opinion about the existence or
his control over any bank records, thus making the fifth amendment privilege inapplicable. Id.
at 2351. The Court then reasoned that if the executed directive is effective under local law,
then the recipient bank can comply with the Government's request without violating any
secrecy laws. Id. at 2351-52. The Court noted that the government of the Cayman Islands
maintains that a compelled consent, such as the one at issue, is not sufficient to authorize the
release of confidential records. Id. at 2351 n.16. While refusing to decide the effectiveness of
the directive under foreign law as it had no bearing on the constitutional issue, the Court
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created and held in one of the bank's branch offices in Country y.20
The bank refused to produce the documents alleging that disclosure
would violate Country Y's banking secrecy laws, and subject the bank
to criminal prosecution in Country Y.
21
While urging the government to use other means to obtain the
documents, the bank cooperated as much as possible with the investi-
gation.22 Country X, in an attempt to block further proceedings,
delivered a note verbale to the Department of State requesting that
"no compelling means" be ordered against its bank.23 Despite these
actions, the district court, after several hearings, held the bank in con-
tempt and fined it $50,000 per day until it complied with the order.24
The Bank appealed.25
The court of appeals, in a per curium opinion, reversed the dis-
trict court's contempt order against the bank.26 Expressly limiting its
decision to the "peculiar facts of this case," the court found that the
bank acted in good faith and was, therefore, not compelled to comply
with the subpoena. 27 The court, however, plainly refused to decide
whether a court may order the delivery of bank documents in viola-
tion of foreign law. 28 Nevertheless, In re Sealed brought to the fore-
front the two primary concerns facing the courts when multinational
succinctly stated: "[W]e are not unaware of the international comity questions implicated by
the Government's attempts to overcome protections afforded by the laws of another nation."
Id. at 2351-52 n.16. The Court, however, was not faced with the issue.
20. In re Sealed, 825 F.2d at 495. Country Y is a foreign nation with banking secrecy laws
that make it a crime for a bank or person to reveal information about banking transactions or
bank documents created in Country Y that relate to a customer and his transactions to anyone
other than the customer. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The bank demonstrated cooperation by the fact that the bank manager traveled to
Washington several times to meet with prosecutors and testified before the grand jury
regarding his personal knowledge of the targets and their activities. Id.
23. Id. at 496. A note verbale is "[a] memorandum or note, in diplomacy, not signed, sent
when an affair has continued a long time without any reply, in order to avoid the appearance of
an urgency which perhaps is not required." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1397 (5th ed. 1979).
24. In re Sealed, 825 F.2d at 496.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 499. The civil contempt order issued by the district court against the manager
was affirmed. Id. For a discussion of the subpoena directed at the bank manager, see supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
27. In re Sealed, 825 F.2d at 498. For a discussion of the "good faith" analysis, see infra
notes 126-147 and accompanying text.
28. In re Sealed, 825 F.2d at 498. The court stated:
We do not decide here the general issue of whether a court may ever order action
in violation of foreign laws, although we should say that it causes us considerable
discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law,
particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question.
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banks "doing business" in the United States are served with a grand
jury subpoena: due process and sovereignty.
III. PREVAILING ISSUES
Due process concerns arise when the bank, as a non-party wit-
ness, is placed in the fundamentally unfair position of having to
choose which law to follow.29 If it complies with the grand jury sub-
poena and discloses the requested information located in the foreign
country, the bank is forced to violate that country's banking secrecy
laws, thus exposing itself to criminal prosecution. Conversely, if it
refuses to comply with the subpoena, the bank faces severe civil penal-
ties in the United States. The sovereignty issue centers around the
customary right of a state to promulgate any laws it desires and to
define the sanctions it will impose on those who violate them within
its territorial boundary.3 ° This issue focuses primarily upon comity
and other basic international law principles.
The due process and jurisdictional sovereignty issues have given
rise to a complex dichotomy of jurisprudence. This dichotomy is evi-
dent when relevant court decisions prioritize one of these issues over
the other, reaching inconsistent results. A court's attitude toward the
relative importance of each issue becomes outcome determinative to
the case's disposition. Accordingly, a prerequisite to understanding
the divergent case law is a close examination of these underlying
issues and their constituent elements. In this context, an understand-
ing of the due process issue is predicated upon an understanding of
the sovereignty concept, therefore, sovereignty will be discussed first.
A. The International Concerns Of Sovereignty
The sovereignty issue is predicated upon the classic notion of ter-
ritorial sovereignty. Simply stated, a state has exclusive authority
over the exercise of governmental power within its borders.3' Fur-
thermore, absent a state's consent, no law has any effect beyond the
limits of the sovereign from which its authority is derived.32 Thus,
29. The due process clause affords substantive protection of life, liberty, and property. U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
30. The Supreme Court, in an early decision, The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), articulated the customary right a nation possesses as an
independent sovereign. Then, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would
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where a potential jurisdictional conflict exists, a court should look
beyond the lexfori 33 and consider a foreign state's interest.34 In such
instances, United States federal courts may be bound not only by
domestic law, but by international law as well. 35  The international
principle that sets the standard for resolving these conflicting jurisdic-
tional issues is commonly called "the comity of nations."
Comity, recognized by the Supreme Court in 1895,36 originated
33. The principle of lex fori states that a domestic forum controls its own procedure and
reflects the broader policy concern of affording litigants a full and fair opportunity to prove
their claims. See Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust
Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 614 (1979); Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp.
435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953) ("Procedures of the law of the forum customarily govern law suits."),
modified, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
34. See Note, Marc Rich, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 149, 160 (1985).
35. Id The judicial doctrine which addresses these conflicts is the act of state doctrine.
This doctrine originated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The Supreme Court
stated: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." Id. at 252. It is based on the principle of judicial
restraint and aimed at preventing judicial interference with foreign relations by discouraging
judicial questioning of a foreign law's validity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at
§ 443 comment a. The doctrine has primarily been applied to cases involving the taking of
property by a foreign state where the property is located. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963). Sabbatino involved a claim by Banco Nacional for proceeds
from a sugar shipment against the court appointed receiver. Id. at 405-06. The receiver
claimed title on behalf of the former owners on the ground that Cuba's seizure of the sugar
estate was contrary to international law. Id. at 406. While holding that the act of state
doctrine did not permit review of acts of a foreign state done within its own territory, the
Court cautioned that "[w]hile historic notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the wisdom
of employing the act of state doctrine, they do not dictate its existence." Id. at 421. It noted
that "international law does not require application of the doctrine" and that its "continuing
vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."
Id at 421, 427-28. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) ("To
permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned
by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between
governments ...... "; Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1115 (5th Cir. 1985) (Under
the act of state doctrine, the court refused to judge the validity of public acts of a sovereign
state performed within its own territory.); c.f Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Acts of foreign governments
purporting to have extraterritorial effect-and consequently, by definition, falling outside the
scope of the act of state doctrine-should be recognized by the courts only if they are
consistent with the law and policy of the United States."); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (refused to extend the act of state doctrine to acts
committed by a foreign sovereign in the course of their commercial activities); First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (Where the executive branch
expressly represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine would not
advance the interests of American foreign policy, the doctrine should not be applied by the
courts.). For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign
Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV.
327 (1983).
36. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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as an extension to the territorial sovereignty principle.37 Today, it is
generally defined as "the degree of deference that a domestic forum
must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on
the forum."38 Furthermore, comity is not a rule of law, but rather a
principle of "practical convenience and expediency based on [the] the-
ory that a court that first asserts jurisdiction will not be interfered
with in [the] continuance of its assertion by a court of a foreign juris-
diction unless it is desirable that one give way to the other. ' 39 Judi-
cial recognition and application of this principle fosters international
cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predict-
ability through the satisfaction of mutual expectations. 4°
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court stressed that comity
requires "a more particularized analysis of the respective interests of
the foreign nation and the requesting nation."41 In any jurisdictional
conflict, courts should look at both the domestic and foreign interests
at stake in order to maintain an adequate level of predictability and
stability among nations. This involves two steps of analysis. First,
the court must determine whether there is a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law.42 If a conflict does exist, the court should
seek a reasonable accommodation that reconciles the central concerns
of both sets of laws.43 This second step requires consideration of the
foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and the mutual
interests of all nations in the context of international harmony.
Application of comity's principles in United States courts will pro-
mote a smoothly functioning global, legal regime. 4
The principle of comity does have limitations, however. Foreign
law may be applied as a favor and a courtesy, and not as a matter of
right. No domestic forum has an absolute obligation to enforce for-
eign interests when they are fundamentally adverse to their own inter-
ests.45 Additionally, the above analysis should be undertaken only
37. Id. at 163. In Hilton, the Court defined comity as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, with
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Id. at 164.
38. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
39. Neal v. State, 135 So.2d 891, 895 (1961).
40. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.
41. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2555 (1987).
42. Id. at 2561-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id.
45. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937; See Comment, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis
Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320, 1328 (1983) (Comity ignores the strong
national interest in deciding cases on the basis of all relevant information.).
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when there are strong international concerns at stake. To determine
the international concerns involved when a federal court exercises
extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is necessary to understand the individ-
ual state interests. The due process issue encompasses these interests.
B. Due Process: A Balance Of Competing Interests
The due process issue entails a discussion of the competing inter-
ests that place the bank in a "fundamentally unfair position." In this
discussion of competing interests, three factors are considered. The
first factor considered is the national interests of the United States in
investigating crime beyond its territory. This requires an understand-
ing of the traditional value common law has placed upon grand jury
investigations and the extraterritorial reach of its subpoena power.
Additionally, recent congressional attempts to combat offshore crimi-
nal activity will be discussed.46 The second factor considered is the
interests of foreign countries in maintaining the secrecy of their bank-
ing transactions and keeping them beyond the reach of other jurisdic-
tions. An examination of nondisclosure laws, and their place in the
international economic and financial community, will be undertaken.
Finally, this subsection will analyze the nature and extent of the hard-
ships that a bank is subject to when these countervailing factors can-
not be reconciled.
1. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Historically, the grand jury's role in investigating possible crimi-
nal activity has been considered essential to the function of the crimi-
nal justice system." It serves the dual function of determining if there
46. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
47. Long before the creation of the American colonies, the grand jury's authority to
compel witnesses to appear and testify had been recognized in England. Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 269, 279 (1919). As early as 1612, Lord Bacon declared that "all subjects, without
distinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute and service, not only of their deed and hand, but
their knowledge and discovery." Id. at 279-80. By the time the Constitution was adopted,
"the grand jury was a revered institution not simply because it served as a buffer between the
state and the individual, but equally for its service as a watchdog against public corruption and
its capacity to ferret out criminal activity that local officials either chose to ignore or were
unable to investigate. W. La Fave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 350-51 (1985). The grand
jury was embedded in the Constitution under the fifth amendment. It provides: "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (The establishment in the Constitution of the grand jury "as the sole
method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it (holds] as an
instrument of justice."). But see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (State grand jury
requirements may be abolished by legislation, as the fifth amendment provision concerning
indictments does not apply to the states.).
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is "probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the pro-
tection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."4 The
Supreme Court has traditionally granted the grand jury wide discre-
tion in seeking evidence through the subpoena power. 49 As clearly
stated in an early Supreme Court decision, "the public.., has a right
to every man's evidence, except for those persons protected by a con-
stitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege."50 A grand jury may
compel the production of evidence or the testimony of a witness it
considers appropriate even if there is no charge against the person.51
The witness is generally not permitted to have counsel present while
testifying.5 2 The Federal Rules of Evidence, except for those concern-
ing privilege, do not apply to grand jury proceedings.5" More impor-
tantly, the exclusionary rule does not apply in the grand jury
context. 4 Therefore, there is no requirement that one demonstrate
48. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974) (A grand jury
proceeding is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a criminal proceeding should be
instituted against any person, thus its investigative authority must be broad if it is going to
discharge its public responsibility adequately.); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (As the grand
jury's task is to inquire into possible criminal conduct and to return only well-founded
indictments, its investigative powers are broad.). The Supreme Court rejected any fourth or
fifth amendment limitations on the grand jury's power to subpoena a witness in United States
v. Dionoso, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Holding that the grand jury possesses broad authority to
determine if a crime has been committed, and who has committed it, the Court refused to
require any showing that the state demonstrate the reasonableness of the subpoena issued.
Dionoso, 410 U.S. At 15. The Court reasoned that "[a]ny holding that would saddle a grand
jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would.., impede its investigation and frustrate
the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." Id. at 17.
But see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1905) (A grand jury subpoena will be quashed if it is
too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable under the fourth amendment.).
50. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668 (quoting in part United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)).
51. Blair, 250 U.S. at 282. See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)
(The power of a federal court to compel persons to testify is firmly established.).
52. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). In Mandujano, a party was
informed that he could have the assistance of counsel, but counsel could not be in the jury
room as criminal proceedings had not been instituted. Id. Hence, the sixth amendment right
to counsel was inapplicable. Id. See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (A
person's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only after an adversary
proceeding has been initiated against them.); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (There is
no constitutional right of a witness being represented by counsel during a grand jury
proceeding.). But see the proposal for change in the separate opinion of Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall in Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 602-609.
53. FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(2). See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363
(1956) (The Court rejected an attack on an indictment which was concededly based entirely on
hearsay evidence.).
54. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1973). In Calandra, the Court
determined that extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would "unduly
interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties." Idl
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the reasonableness of a subpoena."
This broad investigative power of the grand jury has come under
close scrutiny in recent years. Critics have come to question the his-
toric position of the grand jury in today's system of justice. 56 Specifi-
cally, the courts are divided over the expansive role played by the
prosecutor. " Critics argue that the grand jury should be treated
solely as an investigatory and procedural arm of the executive branch
of government. 58 The Supreme Court has refused to accept this posi-
tion, and has continued to follow the precedent granting wide latitude
to the grand jury in its investigations.59 Notwithstanding, many lower
55. See United States v. Dionoso, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). In Dionoso, the Supreme Court
held that the grand jury possessed broad authority to investigate a crime and, thus, refused to
require any showing of reasonableness by the state. Id.
56. See, e.g., La Fave, supra note 47, at 350-52 (1985) (The eighteenth century grand jury
is no longer relevant in today's highly urbanized society.). Arnella, Reforming the Federal
Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78
MICH. L. REV. 463, 469 (1980) (The pretrial process virtually adjudicates the individual
accused.); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1169-72 (1960) (describes the changes in emphasis in the grand jury
during the last decade); Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. REV. 33,
57 (1979) (The grand jury no longer serves the role the constitutional drafters envisioned.).
57. The role of the prosecutor has been characterized as follows:
Working with the police, the prosecutor determines what witnesses will be called
and when they will appear. He examines the witnesses and advises the grand
jury on the validity of any legal objections the witnesses might present. If a
witness refuses to comply with a subpoena, it is the prosecutor who seeks a
contempt citation. If a witness refuses to testify on grounds of self-incrimination,
it is the prosecutor who determines whether an immunity grant will be obtained.
The grand jury must, almost of necessity, rely upon the prosecutor's leadership.
La Fave, supra note 47 at 351. Compare United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.) (The
grand jury is a law enforcement agency serving the investigative and prosecutorial arms of the
executive branch.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147, 149
(6th Cir. 1982) (grand juries are an investigative prosecutorial arm of the executive branch of
government) with United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.) ("Under the consti-
tutional scheme the grand jury is not and should not be captive to any of the three branches."),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
58. See Prosecutorial Misconduct In The Grand Jury: Dismissal Of Indictments Pursuant
To The Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129 (1987); The Grand Jury
Subpoena: Is it the Prosecutor's "Ultimate Weapon" Against Defense Attorneys and Their
Clients?, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 791 (1986); Vaira, The Role of the Prosecutor Inside the
Grand Jury Room: Where is the Foul Line?, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1129 (1984).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (The grand jury is
accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law.); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (The public has a right to everyman's evidence.); Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (The grand jury has broad power to institute criminal
proceedings.); United States v. Dionoso, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (The grand jury possesses broad
authority to determine whether a crime has been committed.). The Supreme Court, in
Dionoso, cautioned: "This is not to say that a grand jury subpoena is some talisman that
dissolves all constitutional protections . . . . The Fourth Amendment provides protection
against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable." Dionoso, 410 U.S. at 11 (citation omitted).
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courts have begun to exercise their supervisory power over the admin-
istration of criminal justice, and impose investigatory limits."°
The first court to exercise its supervisory power and depart from
the Supreme Court dicta was the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in the two Schofield cases (I and II).61 In Schofield
I, Schofield, a potential investigatory target, was subpoenaed to
appear before the grand jury.62 Schofield appeared but was not asked
to testify.6 3 Rather, she was directed by the United States Attorney to
submit to handwriting exemplars, and allow her photograph and fin-
The wide latitude traditionally granted to grand jury investigations has initiated a new
controversy in recent years. This controversy revolves around the secrecy afforded to all grand
jury investigations and the possible disclosure of materials to attorneys for civil litigation.
There is a long established policy of secrecy in the grand jury proceedings. See United States
v. Procter and Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1957); Costello, 350 U.S. at 362.
In recent years this policy has come under close scrutiny. The Court addressed this in
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983). In Sells, the defendants, under a
plea bargaining arrangement, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the
Government by obstructing an IRS investigation. Id. at 421. Thereafter, the Government
moved to disclose all of the grand jury materials to attorneys in the Justice Department's Civil
Division for use in preparing a possible civil suit against the defendants. Id. The defendants
opposed the disclosure alleging fear of grand jury misuse for civil purposes. Id. at 422. The
district court granted the request, concluding that attorneys in the Civil Division are entitled
to disclosure as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i),
which authorizes disclosure of grand jury materials without a court order to "an attorney for
the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty." Id. at 422. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding that the
attorneys could only obtain disclosure upon a showing of particularized "need" under Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i). Id. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the particularized need
standard. Id. at 443. Specifically, a party seeking disclosure must show that the material
sought is required in order to avoid possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the
need for the disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that the request is
structured to cover only the necessary materials. Id. Although the standard in Sells appears to
be a narrow one, when taken a step further, it opens the door for defendants to be held liable in
civil proceedings on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
60. Federal courts possess the power to supervise the administration of criminal justice by
"establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942). See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d
1005, 1012 (4th Cir. 1982) (Courts have supervisory power over the conduct of the grand jury
proceeding, and they have the power to fashion rules to further the administration of justice
when such rules are necessary.). For a more thorough discussion of the court's supervisory
power, see Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Powers in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); Note,
The Superisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
61. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973) (Schofield I) and In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975) (Schofield
II).
62. Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 87. The subpoena solely commanded Mrs. Schofield to appear
at the time and place designated "to testify in the above-entitled case." Id. It did not contain




gerprints to be taken.64 After conferring with her attorney, she
refused, and the district court held her in contempt.65 The Third Cir-
cuit reversed stating:
[W]e think it reasonable that the Government be required to make
some preliminary showing by affidavit that each item is at least
relevant to an investigation being conducted by the grand jury and
properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for
another purpose. We impose this requirement both pursuant to
the federal courts' supervisory power over grand juries and pursu-
ant to our supervisory power over civil proceedings brought in the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a).66
Schofield II raises questions concerning the district court's appli-
cation of the holding in Schofield I on remand. 67 The appellate court
affirmed the district court's finding on remand that the affidavit sub-
mitted by the government met the Schofield I requirements. 6 Justify-
ing its decision in Schofield I, the Schofield II court explained that it
did not interpret Schofield I as a major deviation from previous
Supreme Court decisions.69 It reasoned that Schofield I "did not
intend to impede the grand jury process by requiring hearings in every
case." 70 Rather, "it merely restated [the] district court's authority to
deal individually with the facts of each subpoena.171  Thus, in the
Third Circuit, the Schofield three-prong requirement of relevancy,
proper jurisdiction, and proper purpose must be shown.7 2
The Schofield requirement has received much criticism and few
federal appellate circuits have chosen to follow the Third Circuit's
reasoning.73 Today, the grand jury's power to obtain evidence
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id at 88.
66. Id. at 93.
67. Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 964.
68. Id. Schofield I did not require a showing of reasonableness or probable cause, or a
hearing in every case. Id. at 966. What it did require was a minimum showing that the item
sought was (1) relevant to the investigation, (2) properly within the grand jury's jurisdiction,
and (3) not sought for another purpose. Id. The court took specific notice of United States v.
Dionoso, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 16 (1973), and Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which affidavits were also supplied to the district courts
although there was no mention of them in the opinions. Id. at 966.
69. Id at 965.
70. Id. at 966.
71. Id. The court emphasized that the decision to require additional information is
committed to the sound discretion of the judge. Id. at 965.
72. The Schofield II court defined relevancy as follows: "Relevancy, in the context of a
Grand Jury proceeding is not a probative relevancy, for it cannot be known in advance
whether the document produced will actually advance the investigation. It is rather a
relevancy to the subject matter of the investigation." Id. at 967 n.4 (quoting In re Morgan, 377
F. Supp. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
73. See United States v. McClean, 565 F.2d 318, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1977) ("In the absence of
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remains virtually unlimited, and the grand jury may investigate any
crime that is within the jurisdiction of the court.74 The jurisdiction of
the court has extended beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States, thus enhancing the power of the grand jury. This extraterrito-
rial reach is governed by principles of international law.
International law distinguishes between three general categories
of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate and
jurisdiction to enforce." Jurisdiction to prescribe is relevant in any
instance where a grand jury is attempting, through its subpoena
power, to require a bank to produce documents located in another
jurisdiction. There are five principle bases of jurisdiction to prescribe:
principles of territoriality, nationality, universality, and the protective
and passive personality principles.76 The territorial principle is the
most common basis.77
Territorial jurisdiction is founded upon two premises. First, as
explained earlier, it allows states to regulate the conduct or status of
individuals physically within the territory.78 Second, and perhaps
more significantly, territorial jurisdiction applies to activity that
occurs outside a state's territorial boundary, but which has, or is
intended to produce, substantial effects within it.79 Under the latter
a witness asserting harassment or prosecutorial misuse of the system, we will not impose upon
the government or the district courts any preliminary requirements or procedures which
would impede the grand jury's investigative powers."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 555
F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977) ("In view of the presumption that the government obeys the law, we
see no reason to inject into routine grand jury investigations the delay and imposition upon
district courts that will be opened up by a rule institutionalizing these disclaiming affidavits.").
Cf In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) (The court refused to adopt Schofield
unless some convincing demonstration that the requirements were necessary to prevent
systematic abuse, but went on to say that district courts could freely require the showings as a
means of assuring themselves that the grand jury is not overreaching.). But see In re Special
Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d 1005, 1012 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[I]n exercise of our supervisory
power over federal grand jury proceedings in this circuit, the preliminary showing described is
appropriate to protect a person's interest in maintaining a proper attorney-client
relationship.").
74. Marc Rich v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir.) (The court explained that it
would be strange if the United States could punish a foreign corporation for violating criminal
laws upon a theory that the corporation was constructively present in the jurisdiction at the
time the event occurred, and a federal grand jury could not investigate to ascertain if a crime
had been committed.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at § 401. For a detailed discussion on the
various bases of jurisdiction, see Zagaris & Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional
Considerations in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 303 (1985).
76. For purposes of this discussion, the only relevant principle is territoriality. For an
extensive discussion on the other principles see the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at
§ 402 and the comments following.
77. Id. at § 402 comment c.
78. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
79. This is commonly referred to as the "effects test" and was established in S.S. Lotus (Fr.
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premise, a government may prescribe the conduct of an individual in
the same manner as if he were present in the jurisdiction where the
detrimental effect occurred.8" Grand juries may use this "effects doc-
trine" as a basis for expanding the exercise of the subpoena power
abroad.81 This principle, however, should be applied with caution in
light of the inherently different discovery procedures between civil law
and common law countries.8 2
In addition to its broad investigatory power, Congress provides
the grand jury wide discretion in obtaining evidence regarding bank-
ing activities.8 3 The Bank Secrecy Act,84 promulgated in 1970, allows
prosecutors to circumvent foreign secrecy laws if they can trace the
flow of illegal funds to foreign accounts. This is made possible
v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7, 1927). In Lotus, the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated:
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is
that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State .... It does not,
however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which
have taken place abroad ....
Id. at 18-19.
80. See Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 666. In Marc Rich, the court stated:
[I]t is certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have
given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal
law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission
are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having
been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the
offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.
Id. at 666 (quoting 2 MOORE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 202, at 244 (1986)).
81. The effects doctrine is partially embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982). Under section
1783 a court may order the appearance of a witness who is in a foreign country or require the
production of documents, if the court determines that these are necessary in the interests of
justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a). If a witness, served in the foreign country, does not comply, he
may be held in contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 1784 (1982). The constitutionality of Section 1783
was upheld in Blackmer v. United States. 284 U.S. 421 (1931). The Court stated "[t]hat the
United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country
of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in
case of refusal." Id. at 437.
82. The civil law system is one of the two major legal systems of the Western world. In
civil law countries, evidence is obtained by a judicial officer. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2562
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, as discovery is primarily a job
for the courts, it is considered to be closely tied to sovereignty rights. Id. Conversely, in
common law practice, the litigants have the duty of privately obtaining evidence to be
presented at trial. Id Specifically, the scope of discovery in the United States is much
broader than in other jurisdictions. Id. at 2554. For a discussion of the civil-law system see A.
VON MEHREN AND J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (2d ed. 1977).
83. See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-36 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
84. Id.
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through elaborate record keeping85 and reporting 6 techniques
required of banks in the United States.
Recent concern over the use of offshore banks to launder pro-
ceeds of criminal activities and to evade taxes prompted the enact-
ment of two Acts: The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19847
and the Money Laundering Act. 8 The Crime Control Act is
designed to make foreign-kept business records more accessible for
admission into evidence in criminal trials.8 9 The Money Laundering
Act permits the Secretary of Treasury to summon a foreign bank's
officers and employees to testify under oath and produce documentary
evidence. 9° The success of these acts, however, will depend on the
ability of the federal courts to enforce the orders under international
law.
The domestic interests of the United States in investigating crimi-
nal activities are great. Taken alone, they appear to override all other
interests. With the economic reality of the interdependence of
nations, however, foreign interests must be acknowledged and
respected. 91
2. FOREIGN INTERESTS
Foreign response to attempts by federal courts in the United
States to exercise their broad subpoena power is hostile. Protests to
the extraterritorial reach is primarily expressed through a state's legis-
lation. 92 In an attempt to prevent any extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction in their territory, many enact nondisclosure laws, that
prevent the disclosure of any specified information.93 Generally, there
are two types of nondisclosure legislation: secrecy laws and "blocking
statutes."9 " Although the underlying reason behind the enactment of
each statute is different, their effect of prohibiting disclosure is the
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1982).
86. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312-5316 (1982).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982), as amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, ch. 9, § 901(c)(2), 1'984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2135.
88. Money Laundering Control Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1516, 18(a) (1986).
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3292, 3504-3507 (1982).
90. See supra note 88.
91. As early as 1960, banks cautioned that the extraterritorial reach of subpoenas
presented important policy questions of branch banking throughout the world. Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960). More specifically, banks cautioned that a
subpoena served on a branch operating in the United States that requires a search for records
in a bank located in a foreign country might have the effect of causing retaliatory laws to be
enacted to the detriment of American business interests. Id.
92. See supra note 3.




same. Thus, most courts do not attempt to distinguish between the
two.
Secrecy laws are commonly recognized in the banking and finan-
cial communities.9" Their purpose is to protect the confidentiality of
client transactions and thereby attract foreign investors.96 Bank
secrecy laws find their origin in the privacy laws that are a part of the
codes of most civil law countries.97 The secrecy laws are predicated
upon the right to personal privacy that persons who hire a profes-
sional are entitled.98 Any breach of confidentiality, unlike in common
law countries, is considered a crime.9 9 Thus, the banker, a profes-
sional, is subject to penal sanctions if he discloses any private cus-
tomer information. Most jurisdictions throughout the world have
some type of banking secrecy law. 100
Countries view their secrecy laws not only as a sovereign right to
protect individual privacy, but as a source of profit for the country. 01
Additionally, with the expanding international markets, these laws
serve to meet the legitimate needs of both individual and multina-
tional businesses. 0 2  Unfortunately, in recent years, these secrecy
95. See Comment, US. Enforcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 13, 19
(1986).
96. Id
97. See Comment, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider Trading
Regulations and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and
Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 541, 544-45 (1984).
98. Id
99. Id at 545. Common law countries often prescribe only professional discipline for
breaches of professional secrecy. Id.
100. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CRIME AND
SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 230 (Comm. Print 1983). For a
discussion on Swiss bank secrecy laws, see Comment, supra note 97; B. Meyer, Swiss Banking
Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978); see
also Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining
the Swiss national interest).
101. See, generally, R. JOHNS, TAX HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FINANCE (1983) for a
discussion on the financial advantages and disadvantages of secrecy jurisdictions.
102. See Comment, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics
Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 133, 134-35 (1985). The author
stated:
There are at least [five] legitimate reasons justifying individual use of bank
secrecy jurisdictions: (1) capital flight from political, religious, and racial
persecution; (2) freedom from oppressive government, confiscatory taxes and the
risks of war; (3) freedom from unwanted popularity and threats to one's
reputation; (4) protection from legal judgment; and (5) protection from the
increasing domestic threat of robbery ....
Id at 134 n. 5. The author further stated that domestic companies use offshore banks for
various purposes:
(1) to avoid taxation; (2) to avoid regulation; (3) to profit from higher interest
rates when lending; (4) to enjoy lower interest rates when borrowing; (5) to enjoy
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jurisdictions have been manipulated by those seeking to circumvent
United States laws and frustrate criminal investigations. 0 3 Among
the most common illegal activities are insider trading,' °4 criminal
fraud, 05 and tax evasion.'0 6 Particularly acute has been the launder-
ing of profits by high-level narcotics traffickers."10
Blocking statutes, 08 unlike secrecy laws, are directly intended by
foreign countries to thwart foreign discovery in their territory."°
Most were enacted after the United States began exercising its sub-
poena power abroad. Specifically, these statutes grew in response to
the enforcement of United States antitrust laws overseas." 0 Countries
use these statutes as a way to block the United States legislation and
protect their territorial sovereignty. Some statutes cover all docu-
ments, while others prohibit the disclosure of certain categories of
information.I' Usually, all provide for penal sanctions if information
is disclosed. 1
2
Both the secrecy laws and the blocking statutes comprise what is
known as the foreign government compulsion defense.'1' 3 It is this
type of defense that a bank uses as a shield from grand jury investiga-
the protections of confidentiality when engaged in activities which, if known to
others in advance, might hazard business success or profit margins; and (6) to
hedge and enjoy such other risk allaying methods as offshore diversification,
liquidity and forward speculations.
Id. at 135 n. 6 (citation omitted). See generally R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS,
AND COMPANIES (1984) (analyzing the risks and benefits of the offshore financial community).
103. See generally Blum, supra note 102; Meyer, supra note 100.
104. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (A
Swiss corporation purchasing stock traded on the Philadelphia stock exchange based on
insider information.).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Defendants in a scheme to defraud used secret bank accounts in a number of secrecy havens
to hide illegally obtained shipping profits.), cer. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
106. See, e.g., Marc Rich v. United States, 707 F.2d 663-65 (2d Cir.) (A subsidiary diverted
taxable income to the Swiss parent in order to evade United States income tax.), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1215 (1983).
107. See generally Comment, supra note 102.
108. As defined in section 442 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, "[b]locking statutes are designed to take advantage of the foreign government
compulsion defense ...by prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of
documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign
authorities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at § 442 note 4 (1987).
109. For a general discussion of the history and effects of blocking statutes see Batista,
Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-resident
Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW 61 (1983).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at § 442 note 4 (1987). See, e.g., United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at § 442 note 4 (1987).
112. Id.
113. Id. at § 442 note 5.
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tion attempts." 4 On the other hand, this legislation also represents
legitimate attempts by countries to protect their privacy and sovereign
rights.11" When viewed in this manner, they pose a difficult issue for
courts reviewing government motions to compel disclosure. Simi-
larly, they place the bank in the more 'difficult position of choosing
which law to follow.
3. THE HARDSHIP ON THE BANK AS A NON-PARTY WITNESS
In their attempts to operate in the international marketplace and
provide a valuable service, multinational banks doing business in the
United States endure a considerable amount of hardship. They are in
a position where they must violate another country's laws, or be held
in contempt of court. Some courts arbitrarily reconcile these conflict-
ing interests by simply declaring that a man cannot serve two masters
and, thus, should surrender to the the jurisdiction of one sovereign.' 16
This stance is particularly alarming when the bank is a non-party
witness.
The situation presented by a non-party witness is fundamentally
different from a situation involving actual parties. Traditionally, wit-
nesses have been afforded greater protection from discovery orders
than have parties. Since the bank is a mere witness, courts generally
reason that it should not incur any criminal liability for noncompli-
ance with the subpoena. 117 In recent years, courts have neglected this
important distinction and justified compulsion based on the reasoning
that if you choose to operate in the United States, you must abide by
the laws of the jurisdiction."' This reasoning is without foresight, as
the commercial world is interdependent, and the United States is sub-
ject to the jurisdictions of other forums.
Thus, the Comment will now examine how courts reconcile the
national interests of the United States in investigating criminal activ-
ity and the foreign interests in protecting their privacy laws. This will
be done in light of the important sovereignty issues involved.
IV. JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
The judicial doctrine attempting to accommodate the often con-
flicting due process and sovereignty issues is complex and controver-
114. Id. at § 442 note 4.
115. See Id. at § 441.
116. See First National City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
117. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960).
118. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1119 (1983); see also supra note 7.
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sial. A uniform approach does not yet exist that deals with the
multitude of problems posed by the extraterritorial exercise of the
grand jury subpoena power. Courts considering the issues apply an
ad hoc criterion analysis. Two standards that have gained general
acceptance are the Societe Internationale19 good faith test and the
Restatement factor analysis. 120 Although neither criterion is disposi-
tive among the federal appellate circuits, most courts consider their
application. The inconsistency arises, however, when courts apply
different amounts of leverage to the various factors. This is what
places the cases in a confusing and contradictory paradigm, attributed
to the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court and the Legislature.
The only Supreme Court decision that dealt directly with these
issues was, Societe Internationale v. Rogers 121 decided in 1958. Societe
Internationale established the "good faith" standard by which courts
measure the validity and effect of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 122 The
Court, in Societe Internationale, however, failed to define what could
be considered "good faith" efforts, thus allowing lower courts to
manipulate the standard to produce their own desired results. Hence,
it is necessary to first analyze the facts of Societe Internationale and its
underlying concern for international comity, in order to understand
its limited precedential value. In light of advances in computer tech-
nology and transportaion, distinctions must be drawn between the
commercial world as the Societe Internationale Court saw it forty
years ago, and as it is today. Due to this technologically advanced
environment, the Supreme Court should readdress this important
controversy in order to alleviate the pressures placed upon members
of the international financial community.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law has developed a fac-
tor analysis that examines the various competing interests. 123 This
method provides a more acceptable solution to the problem but still
leaves many questions unanswered. While this analysis was first pro-
pounded by the Restatement (Second) in 1965,124 a third edition has
recently been published that expands upon the simple analysis estab-
lished in the second edition.2 5 Both of these standards will be dis-
119. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
120. See infra notes 148-171 and accompanying text.
121. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
122. Id. at 208-09.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at §§ 403, 441, 442 (1987).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1965) [hereinafter Restatement
(Second)l
125. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 124, at § 40 with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) supra note 11, at §§ 403, 441, 442 (1987).
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cussed in order to understand how courts in subsequent cases have
attempted to develop a consistent answer.
A. The Good Faith Test and Societe Internationale'
The good faith test in Societe Internationale holds that a party's
good faith efforts to comply with a production order is the key factor
in considering whether foreign law actually prohibits the disclosure of
documents. 26 In Societe Internationale, a subpoena was directed at a
party litigant, as opposed to a non-party witness. 27  Most courts
applying this test have failed to make this important distinction, thus
placing the bank, a non-party witness, in the same position as the
party litigant. 12' Another important distinction that should have
been addressed by subsequent courts analyzing extraterritorial juris-
diction is that Societe Internationale involved a civil suit.' 29 These
unrecognized distinctions have resulted in what might be considered
unjust decisions.
In Societe Internationale, a Swiss holding company brought an
action to recover property seized during World War 11.130 The com-
pany claimed that the property was wrongfully seized because it was
the property of a corporation of a neutral nation.' 3' During discovery,
the government moved for an order to make the Swiss bank records of
the company available, alleging that the company had conspired with
a German corporation. 32  The government claimed these records
would reveal the true ownership of the seized property.' 33 The com-
pany refused to comply with the subsequent court order, asserting
that it did not control the records, as disclosure would violate Swiss
banking law. '34 Faced with this conflict, the district court referred
126. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 208-09.
127. Id. at 199-200.
128. See, e.g., infra notes 213-44.
129. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir.) ("We have no finding
that appellants have made good faith efforts to comply with the summonses."), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1098 (1981); SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (found the defendant had not shown good faith efforts to comply); cf. Garpeg, Ltd. v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 1240-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (despite the preliminary injunction of a
Hong Kong court, and the fact that Chase's good faith efforts were not disputed, the court,
nevertheless imposed a fine.).
130. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 198-99.
131. Id. at 199.
132. Id. at 199-200. The government moved for an order under Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which, in conjunction with Rule 26(b), allows the court, upon a
showing of good cause, to compel a party to produce the documents relevant to the subject
matter pending in the litigation. Id. at 200.
133. Id. at 200.
134. Id. The plaintiff did not dispute the relevancy of the documents. Id.
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the matter to a special master for a finding as to the mandates of Swiss
law. 135
The special master concluded that Swiss law prohibited disclo-
sure and found no collusion between the company and the Swiss gov-
ernment. 136 Additionally, he found that the bank used good faith
efforts to comply with the subpoena. 137  Despite these findings, the
district court dismissed the claim, holding that Swiss law did not fur-
nish an adequate excuse for the company's failure to comply with the
court order.' 3  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed. 1
39
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed.' 40 Balancing the inter-
ests of both parties, Justice Harlan determined that Swiss law prohib-
ited disclosure and as there was no showing of bad faith on the part of
the company, the district court was not justified in dismissing the
case.' 4' The Court expressly refused, however, to hold that fear of
punishment under the laws of a sovereign precludes courts from find-
ing that the company had "control"' 142 over the documents, a finding
that would operate as a complete bar to a discovery order. 143 Rather,
the Court limited its reasoning to a balance of interests applied to the
"exigencies of [the] particular litigation."' 44 The Court remanded the
case noting that the absence of complete disclosure goes to the ade-
quacy of the company's proof and does not preclude the plaintiff from
being able to contest the subpoena on the merits.'
45
The Supreme Court in Societe Internationale left a confusing pre-
cedent. It held succinctly that a party cannot be penalized for good
faith efforts to comply with a discovery order. The Court failed, how-
ever, to define what constitutes a "good faith" effort. Consequently,
lower courts addressing the good faith issue have developed their own
135. Id. at 201.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 201-02. During the interim period, between the trial court decision and the
appellate court review, many documents were submitted by the plaintiff with the consent of the
Swiss government demonstrating cooperative efforts. Id. at 202-03.
139. Id. at 202.
140. Id. at 213.
141. Id. at 204-05.
142. The control argument has been continually rejected by most federal appellate circuits,
the basis being that the parties have chosen to do business in the United States, and they are
voluntarily placing themselves within the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., United States v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
143. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 205.
144. Id. at 206.
145. Id. at 213.
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criterion, thus causing differing standards to be created. 146 Societe
Internationale, however, did leave one clear precedent. By giving
considerable weight to Swiss law, it established that in any jurisdic-
tional conflict, an analysis of the applicable foreign law is essential. 147
B. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
In 1987, the American Law Institute published the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations.14 While adhering to the factor analysis
established in earlier publications, a more detailed and thorough
examination of those factors was introduced. 149 Before discussing the
analysis suggested by the latest Restatement, it is important to under-
stand the factors established in Section 40 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Foreign Relations, for it is under this factor analysis that most
decisions are predicated.
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations requires a bal-
ance of various factors in order to determine which law will apply
when there is a jurisdictional conflict.15 ° The five nonexclusive factors
listed in § 40 are as follows:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and
nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person; (c) extent to which the required conduct
is to take place in the territory of another state; (d) the nationality
of the person; and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with
the rule prescribed by that state.
151
All of these factors are considered by states adopting the Restatement
approach.
The Restatement (Third) goes beyond the factors stated in Sec-
tion 40 and offers a more complex and elaborate factor analysis. It
includes both a reasonableness and good faith standard. 5 2 Primarily,
three sections are relevant for purposes of the analysis: Section 403
146. For a more complete discussion on the good faith test see Meyer, supra note 100;
Comment, supra note 102; and R. Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984).
147. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 204. The Court stated: "We approach this question
in light of the findings below that the Swiss penal laws did -in fact limit petitioner's ability to
satisfy the production order because of the criminal sanctions to which those producing
records would have been exposed." Id.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11 (1987).
149. See infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
150. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404-07 (5th Cir.) (one of the first cases to
adopt the Restatement analysis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 124, at § 40.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at §§ 403, 442.
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entitled Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe,153 Section 441 enti-
tled Foreign State Compulsion, 15 4 and Section 442 entitled Requests
For Disclosure: Law of the United States. 55 Each will be discussed
separately.
153. Id. at § 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe are listed as follows:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;.
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors,
Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is
clearly greater.
Id.
154. Id. at § 441. Section 441 defines Foreign State Compulsion as follows:
(1) In general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that
state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by
the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national.
(2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the
state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even-if it is required by
the law of the state of which he is a national.
Id.




Section 403, which serves as the premise for Sections 441 and
442, is where the factors of Section 40 are incorporated and expanded
upon. 56 In addition, Section 403 specifically limits Section 402,37
(1) (a) A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute
or rule of court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce
documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or investigation,
even if the information or the person in possession of the information is outside
the United States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject
the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions, including finding of
contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default judgment, or may lead to a
determination that the facts to which the order was addressed are as asserted by
the opposing party.
(c) In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of
information located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency in
the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or
litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of
specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United
States; the availability of alternative means of securing information; and the
extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
(2) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is
prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state
in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state of
which a prospective witness is a national,
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the person to
whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of
contempt, dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to comply with the
order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of
information or of failure to make a good faith effort in accordance with
paragraph (a);
(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact
adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production, even if
that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission from the foreign
authorities to make the information available and that effort has been
unsuccessful.
Id.
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at § 403 note 10 (1987).
157. Id. at § 402. Section 402 describes Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe as follows:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
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which provides the basis of jurisdiction for a state to prescribe law.'
At the outset, Section 403 establishes that reasonableness is the under-
lying criterion in determining the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe
law when seeking documents located in a foreign jurisdiction.'5 9 In
deciding what is reasonable, the court should evaluate "all relevant
factors," that were outlined in Section 40. " Even if it is determined
that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable, Section
403 imposes a burden upon courts in the United States to go one step
further if the laws of the two states are in conflict. Specifically, "each
state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction .. ".. ,,61 This further requirement
forces the court to determine the position of the foreign law. Ulti-
mately, this mode of analysis fosters the notion of comity among
nations. 1
62
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations goes beyond the
general provisions of Sections 402 and 403 and specifically addresses
the foreign state compulsion defense in Sections 441 and 442. These
two Sections, which are new to the Restatement, 163 are based on the
principles of reasonableness and conflict avoidance set forth in Section
403.164
Section 441 addresses the defense of foreign state compulsion in
relation to the regulation of activities generally. 165  The Section
focuses on the position of "persons" caught between conflicting
demands, as in the case of a non-party bank, and attempts to afford
protection to such "persons" by applying the principles in Section
403. 166 A comment to Section 441, however, makes it clear that the
defense is available only when the other state's requirements are
embodied in binding laws or regulations subject to penal or other
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
Id.
158. Section 403 states that even if a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is present, it is
limited by Section 402. Id.
159. Id. at § 403(1).
160. Id. at § 403(2)(a)-(h).
161. Id. at § 403(3).
162. Id. at § 403 comment a.
163. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 124 at § 40 with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 11, at §§ 403, 441, 442. The fact that Sections 441 and 442 were added to
the Restatement demonstrates the pervasiveness of the problem.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, at pt. IV, ch. 4 introductory note. It is
important to note that the defense is recognized in instances where the exercise of jurisdiction
by the territorial state would be unreasonable under Section 403. Id. at § 441 comment a.
165. Id. at pt. IV, ch. 4 introductory note.




Section 442 sets forth the law of the United States on foreign
state compulsion in relation to requests for the disclosure of informa-
tion located in one state and sought in connection with a legal pro-
ceeding in another. 168  In its two subsections, Section 402
substantially departs from the previous analysis in this area. It enu-
merates a new set of factors - beyond those stated in Section 403 -
to be considered by the courts when a party is attempting to obtain
records from abroad and it incorporates the Societe Internationale
good faith test.' 69 Furthermore, the Restatement adopts a relevancy
standard stating, "[I]t is ordinarily reasonable to limit foreign discov-
ery to information necessary to the action - typically, evidence not
otherwise readily obtainable - and directly relevant and material. '10
This may be interpreted as imposing a Schofield-like requirement
upon a subpoena that requests documents in a foreign state that pro-
hibits disclosure."'
In general, the Restatement (Third) more adequately attempts to
deal with these conflicts of jurisdiction by providing more extensive
guidelines. It is still too early, however, to determine how its applica-
tion will effect the case law.
C. Case Analysis
1. THE SECOND CIRCUIT: AN EARLY ANALYSIS
In the years immediately following Societe Internationale, the
Second Circuit of the United States Courts of Appeals established the
precedent for analyzing discovery orders directed to non-parties in
foreign countries. The majority of these cases did not require disclo-
sure when criminal prosecution was probable in the foreign country.
Only when the interests of the United States were significantly greater
than those of the foreign country, or where there was no real danger
of criminal prosecution, did the court enforce a grand jury subpoena
requiring disclosure. In accordance with Societe Internationale, all of
the cases held that a showing of probable criminal prosecution was
required before the foreign interests would be considered.
Two of the earliest cases that set the standard to analyze subse-
quent cases involving grand jury subpoena orders did not involve
167. Id. at § 441 comment c (qualifying what courts have defined as real fear of
prosecution).
168. Id. at pt. IV, ch. 4 introductory note.
169. Id. at §§ 442(1)(c), 442(2)(a).
170. Id. at § 442 comment a.
171. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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criminal charges: First Nat'! Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv. ,172 con-
cerning an IRS summons, and Ings v. Ferguson,17 1 involving corpo-
rate litigation. In First Nat'! Bank, one year after Societe
Internationale, the court undertook a factual analysis of the foreign
law involved. In that case, the IRS, while investigating a Panamanian
corporation with offices in New York and Panama, ordered the pro-
duction of certain bank records. 174 The bank produced the records
located in its New York branch but refused to produce the documents
located in Panama. 75 The bank argued that the documents were
physically located in the Republic of Panama, and that, as such, they
were beyond the reach of the subpoena. 176 Specifically, the bank con-
tended that nonproduction was justified because the bank was not "in
control" of the documents and also because production of the docu-
ments would violate Panamanian law. 177 The court rejected the
bank's arguments, holding that the bank did have control over the
documents in question, and that there was no showing that the laws
of Panama prevented production. 178 Having made that determina-
tion, the court ordered production.' 79 The court went on to explain,
however, that had there been a showing of possible violation, it would
"agree that the production of the Panama records should not be
ordered." 8 0
Following the express language of First Nat'! Bank, the Second
Circuit, in Ings, modified a district court order requiring the produc-
tion of certain documents located in Canada.' While calling into
doubt the control analysis in First Nat'! Bank, the court undertook a
more detailed factor 'analysis. 18 2 It paid particular attention to the
fact that the bank was not a party. 1 3 More importantly, the court
relied heavily upon the opinions of Canadian counsel, that were sup-
plied in affidavits explaining that Canadian law prohibited disclo-
172. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
173. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).




178. Id. at 618-19.
179. Id. at 620.
180. Id. at 619.
181. Ings, 282 F.2d at 153.
182. Id. at 152. The court found it unnecessary to resolve questions as to whether the
manager of the New York agency has the power to direct officers of the Canadian branch to
send out bank records in violation of Canadian law because of "other factors present." Id
183. Id. The court carefully stated: "Every reason exists for careful scrutiny here. No
claim is being made against either bank by any litigant." Id.
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sure. 184 The court, however, in the interests of comity, chose not to
interpret the Canadian law and stated, "Whether removal of records
from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian law and is best
resolved by Canadian courts."'" 5
Although reaching opposite conclusions, both First Nat'l Bank
and Ings applied the same reasoning to the particular facts in each
case. Each court gave considerable weight to the laws of the foreign
state, in order to determine whether a violation of that state's laws
would occur should disclosure be compelled. Thus, although it is odd
that no mention was made of Societe Internationale, the only Supreme
Court case on the subject, both cases applied the analysis established
by it.' 86 More importantly, these cases laid the foundation for the
more difficult analysis involving subpoenas issued in furtherance of a
criminal investigation, and in violation of foreign nondisclosure laws.
Confronted with a conflict between a grand jury subpoena and a
foreign nondisclosure law, the court, in Application of Chase Manhat-
tan Bank,18 7 gave considerable deference to a showing of foreign law
as urged by the two previous cases. 8 In Chase, a subpoena duces
tecum was directed to the Chase Manhattan Bank to produce records
located in the Republic of Panama.189 Rather than complying with
the subpoena, the bank made a showing that if disclosure were com-
pelled, divulgence of the information would constitute a violation of
Panamanian law. 190 The government did not offer any evidence to the
contrary.' 9' After balancing the real interest of the-United States in
obtaining this evidence against the obligation of the United States to
respect the laws of other sovereign states, the court modified the sub-
poena to exclude those documents whose production would violate
Panamanian law. 192
A similar issue was presented in United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank ' 93 where the Second Circuit labeled the issue as one "of consid-
erable importance to American banks with branches or offices in for-
184. Id. at 151.
185. Id. at 152.
186. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text. Perhaps one reason why Societe
Internationale was not mentioned is that Societe Internationale did not involve a nonparty
witness, whereas these cases did. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
187. 297 F.2d 611 (2d. Cir. 1962).
188. Id. at 613.
189. Id. at 611.
190. Id. at 612. A Panamanian attorney testified as to the status of Panamanian law on the
subject. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 613.
193. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
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eign jurisdictions."1 94 First Nat'7 City involved a grand jury subpoena
duces tecum issued to a non-party bank as part of an investigation of
antitrust law violations by the bank's customers. 95 The subpoena
requested documents possessed by the bank in New York and Ger-
many.1 96 The bank refused to produce the documents located in Ger-
many, alleging that German law prohibited their disclosure. 97
The district court, after conducting an extensive examination of
German law, concluded that the bank would not be subject to crimi-
nal sanctions or their equivalent in that country. 9 In addition, the
court found that the bank did not act in good faith in refusing to
comply with the subpoena.' 99 With these factors present, the court
ordered disclosure. 2°° The court of appeals affirmed, explicitly under-
taking the task of developing rules to govern the exercise of extraterri-
torial power.201 First, the court confirmed the district court's finding
that the bank had failed to provide an adequate justification for its
noncompliance with the subpoena, since German law did not prohibit
disclosure.2 °2 Second, the court balanced the national interests of the
United States and Germany as well as the interests of the bank
itself.20 3 In determining that the interests of the United States in this
case outweighed the foreign concerns, the court found it noteworthy
that neither the Department of State nor the German Government
had expressed a view on the case thus suggesting that Germany did
not consider its national interests threatened.2°
The significant aspect of First Nat'! City is the court's extensive
analysis of the foreign law, and its awareness of the international
implications an arbitrary decision might have on branch banking
throughout the world.20 5 Additionally, while not citing to the




198. Id. at 899-900. The court heard testimony of various attorneys who testified that
secrecy laws were not part of a statute, but like a privilege, they can be waived by the customer
or the bank. Id. at 900.
199. Id. at 900. The district court made a specific finding of lack of good faith based upon
the failure by the bank to make a simple inquiry into the nature and extent of the records
available in the German branch. Id. at 900 n.8.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 901.
202. Id. at 902.
203. Id. at 902-05.
204. Id. at 904.
205. As the court of appeals concisely stated: "The complexities of the world being what
they are, it is not surprising to discover nations having diametrically opposed positions with
respect to the disclosure of a wide range of information." Id. at 901. Cf Trade Dev. Bank v.
Continental Insurance, 469 F.2d 35-40 (2d Cir. 1972) (After a careful analysis of the
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Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, it appears to adopt the
factor analysis.
These issues were addressed in the more recent opinion of United
States v. Davis.2 6 During an investigation into the payment of illegal
kickbacks to executives of a corporation, defendant Davis was served
with a subpoena requesting documents located in the Cayman
Islands.2 °7 Davis objected, claiming that under Cayman law, disclo-
sure was permitted only if the customer consented, or if the Cayman
Grand Court directed disclosure. 28 The bank and the Cayman gov-
ernment were ready to comply, but Davis continued to decline pro-
duction. 2° 9 He asserted that as the bank would be subject to criminal
prosecution in the Cayman Islands, the court could not compel
production.210
The court, conducting a Restatement (Second) factor analysis,
rejected this argument.2 1 Paying particular attention to the fact that
there was no objection by the Cayman government against the com-
pulsion of the documents, Davis was ordered to turn over the docu-
ments.212 In its decision, the court implicitly said that it will not
tolerate the manipulation of foreign laws to shield illegal activities.
This appears to be equivalent to a finding of bad faith.
The Second Circuit developed an acceptable method to accom-
modate the interests of United States' law and foreign statutes. It rec-
ognizes the inherent unfairness of subjecting a neutral nonparty to
criminal liability. When a subpoena is issued upon a nonparty bank
in actual contravention of a foreign nondisclosure statute, the court
will compel production only where it appears that the foreign law is
used in bad faith. The court will determine this by examining the
national interests of the United States and those of the foreign state.
This requires an inquiry as to the status of the foreign law, in order to
determine if there is a real threat of prosecution. Of great importance
is any statement by a governmental body on the disposition of the
competing interests, the court held that as a matter of comity, deference should be given to
Swiss law.).
206. 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
207. Id. at 1032. Requests were also made for documents located in Switzerland and
Canada. Id. For this discussion, however, only the documents requested from the Cayman
Islands are important.
208. Id. at 1032.
209. Id. Davis was ordered to cease litigation in the Cayman Islands, blocking the
production of bank records. Id. at 1033.
210. Id. at 1033.
211. Id. at 1034. The court explicitly cited to section 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. Id. at 1033. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
212. Davis, 767 F.2d at 1035.
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case. If there is no objection, and no real fear of criminal prosecution,
then the burden falls upon the bank to show that there were good
faith efforts to comply.
This analysis must be distinguished from a strict Restatement
factor analysis which generally tends to favor the national interests of
the United States. The emphasis of this analysis is upon the foreign
law, and if applicable, the fact that the witness is not a party. It
allows for the recognition of foreign law when circumstances dictate,
such as the possibility of international repercussions.
2. THE NOVA SCOTIA CASES
The Eleventh Circuit of the United States Courts of Appeals,
when confronted with the same issue, twice failed to follow or even
consider, the respective concerns within the Second Circuit's analysis.
Both cases involved the Bank of Nova Scotia. In United States v.
Bank of Nova Scotia2 13 (Nova Scotia I), a federal grand jury con-
ducting a tax and narcotics investigation issued a subpoena duces
tecum upon a branch of a Canadian bank in Miami, Florida.214 The
subpoena called for the production of records maintained in the
bank's Bahamas and Antigua offices. 21 5 The bank refused to produce
the documents, asserting that compliance would violate Bahamian
secrecy law.21 6 The bank presented affidavits with regard to such
impending violations but demonstrated that the government could
obtain judicial assistance from the Supreme Court of the Bahamas.21 7
Additionally, the bank argued that it was fundamentally unfair to
require a mere stakeholder to incur criminal liability in the Baha-
mas.218 The district court, nevertheless, entered a civil contempt
order and refused to acknowledge whether the documents were rele-
vant to the grand jury investigation. 1 9
Using an ad hoc factor analysis, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.220 Citing United States v.
McClean,22 1 the court refused to adopt the Third Circuit's Schofield
rule that requires the government to show that the documents sought
are relevant to the investigation.222 Next, the court looked at both the
213. 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
214. Id. at 1386.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1387.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1388.
219. Id. at 1387.
220. Id. at 1391.
221. 565 F.2d 3181 (5th Cir. 1977).
222. 691 F.2d at 1387. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. In Bonner v.
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Societe Internatioanale good faith test and the Restatement factor
analysis. The court, without explanation, found that the bank did not
demonstrate good faith efforts to comply with the subpoena.223 After
concluding that the case was controlled by United States v. Field,224
the court applied the Restatement factors, relying on the concept of
comity.22- Field held that the managing director of a foreign bank
must comply with a grand jury subpoena despite probable prosecution
in the foreign jurisdiction.226 This case, however, can be factually dis-
tinguished from Nova Scotia I, as it involves a subpoena issued upon
the director of a bank that was itself the target of a criminal investiga-
tion. 22" Additionally, the Nova Scotia I court failed to recognize that
the Field court essentially followed the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit. Only after establishing that Cayman officials could obtain the
information, did the court enforce the subpoena. 228  Thus, like the
Second Circuit, the court refused to allow the manipulation of foreign
law to shield criminal activity.
The Nova Scotia I court, however, failed to inquire as to whether
there was a real threat of prosecution in the foreign country. Further-
more, it never completed the Restatement factor analysis it initially
set out to apply. 229 Rather, it arbitrarily concluded that "the crucial
importance of the collection of revenue to the 'financial integrity of
the republic' outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest in protecting
the right of privacy incorporated into its bank secrecy laws."23
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia231 (Nova Scotia II) con-
cerned the branches in the Bahamas, Antigua, and Cayman
Islands.232 While Nova Scotia I was on the Supreme Court's docket,
the bank was served with another grand jury subpoena duces
tecum.233 Again, the bank refused to comply. 234 Despite the bank's
efforts to comply, the court found that it did not meet the good faith
Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. Nov.
1981).
223. Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1389.
224. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
225. Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1389 (citing United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976)).
226. 532 F.2d at 410.
227. Id. at 405.
228. Id. at 408.
229. Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1389.
230. Id. at 1391.
231. 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1985).
232. Id. at 820.
233. See Comment, supra note 102, at 158.
234. Nova Scotia If, 740 F.2d at 820.
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test and, therefore, enforced the subpoena.2 33
The Eleventh Circuit, after a lengthy factual discussion,
affirmed.236 Once again the court of appeals made an ad hoc analysis
of the factors it considered important. Reiterating the district court's
findings as to lack of good faith, the court added that as the material-
ity requirement of Schofield was not accepted in the jurisdiction, the
banks efforts were concentrated on something that it was not entitled
to receive.237 Subsequently, the court conducted the Restatement fac-
tor analysis examining the foreign interests involved.238 It deter-
mined that the national interests in stemming illegal drug trade was
more vital than any foreign interest.239 The court, however, never
bothered to reach a complete determination as to the status of the
foreign law.240 Rather, it turned to complete the factor analysis, fail-
ing to consider the fact that the bank was not a party.24'
The court also rejected arguments in the amicus curiae briefs
filed by the United Kingdom and the Cayman Islands.242 These amici
briefs represent an important part of the analysis. They demonstrate
that compulsion in this case would have international ramifications.
The Nova Scotia II court did not consider these inherent implications,
however, and lightly dismissed them.243 Though claiming to under-
take an analysis involving international comity, it failed to consider
these amici briefs, demonstrating reasoning to the contrary.
The Nova Scotia decisions, using ad hoc analyses, foreclosed the
availability of the good faith defense for nonparty banks operating in
the Eleventh Circuit. The court appears willing to enforce a subpoena
without due regard for international relations, simply because the
bank is operating within the jurisdiction.2 "
235. Id. The bank corresponded continually with the U.S. Attorney General requesting the
government to send letters rogatory regarding the materiality and necessity of the subpoenaed
documents. Id. at 820. Also, the bank unsuccessfully filed a petition with the Cayman court
for permission to disclose the information. Id.
236. Id. at 825.
237. Id. at 826.
238. Id. at 827.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 827-28.
241. Id. at 828.
242. Id. at 829-32. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the United States is
bound to follow a "gentleman's agreement" because it claimed that it was not applicable or
binding. Id. at 829-30. The court also rejected the argument that the subpoena was void
because it was contrary to the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.
Id. at 831. Finally, the court rejected that the act of state doctrine should be applied. Id at
832.
243. Id. at 829-32.
244. For a complete analysis of the Nova Scotia decisions, see Paikin, Bank of Nova Scotia
I. The American Subpoena and the Multinational Enterprise, 9 CAN. Bus. L.J. 497 (1984)
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3. THE REMAINING CIRCUITS
Two months after the first Nova Scotia decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the need
to make a factual analysis regarding the foreign state's interest and
followed the Second Circuit's method. In United States v. First Nat'l
Bank of Chicago,24 5 the court developed a two-step analysis to deal
with the noncompliance of a production order issued to a nonparty
witness. 246 The bank, claiming that Greek law prevented disclosure
of the requested documents, refused to comply with the subpoena for
fear of criminal prosecution in Greece.247 The court of appeals
examined first whether the bank had sufficiently shown that Greek
law forbade disclosure of the information and second, if so, whether it
should, nonetheless, be compelled to comply. 248 The second step
entails a Restatement factor analysis of the competing interests.249
After a detailed analysis of the Greek statute, along with consid-
eration of the letters submitted by various attorneys, the court con-
cluded that the bank had adequately shown that Greek law forbade
disclosure of the information requested. ° Under the Restatement
analysis, the court balanced the competing interests.251  The court
noted that "[a]lthough the interest of the United States in collecting
taxes is of importance to the financial integrity of the nation, the inter-
ests of Greece, served by its bank secrecy law is also important.
'252
Recognizing this, and the fact that the bank was only a "neutral
source," it refused to order the bank employees to commit an unlaw-
ful act by complying with the subpoena and thereby exposing them-
selves to criminal liability.253
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Eleventh Circuit's con-
trary decision in Nova Scotia 1254 The appellate court in Nova Scotia
I found that the bank had not made good faith efforts to comply with
the subpoena.2 5 It then distinguished First National from the Nova
(Canadian response to the Nova Scotia decision); Note, International Law-Comity of Nations
Fails to Justify a Showing of Relevance Prior to Enforcement of Grand Jury Subpoena, Grand
Jury Proceedings v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 565 (1983).
245. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
246. Id. at 343.
247. Id. at 342.
248. Id. at 343.
249. Id. at 345.
250. Id. at 344-45.
251. Id. at 346.
252. Id. But See Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1391.
253. First Natl Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346.
254. Id. at 345-47.
255. Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1389.
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Scotia cases on the basis that, in First National no finding was made as
to whether the bank acted in good faith.256 As such, the court
remanded the case for a determination of good faith efforts.257
The Seventh Circuit, however, went beyond the analyses in both
of the Nova Scotia cases. Specifically, it focused upon the fact that the
bank, as a nonparty witness, should be afforded a greater amount of
protection.258  Additionally, unlike the Nova Scotia cases, it gave a
certain amount of deference to the foreign law by considering its effect
upon the parties. 259 Under its two-step analysis the Seventh Circuit
followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit. The court recognized
that it is fundamentally unfair to hold a nonparty witness to the same
standard as an actual party, and force it to face criminal liability in a
foreign state.
These important factual distinctions were further acknowledged
recently by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in United States v. Rubin.26 In Rubin, the district court, while inves-
tigating the defendant for securities fraud, issued a subpoena duces
tecum upon the managers of a Cayman Islands bank.261  The sub-
poena encompassed eight bank account records in the Cayman
Islands.262 Operating under the strict bank secrecy laws of the Cay-
man Islands, the manager refused to reveal any bank information
without waivers of the secrecy laws.263 Waivers were obtained for six
of the eight accounts, and therefore, the manager did not testify as to
the remaining two. 264 A motion filed by the manager and the govern-
ment to quash the remaining subpoenas was sustained by the district
court.26 5 The defendant argued that this order violated his constitu-
tional right to present a defense.266
256. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d at 346-47.
257. Id. at 346.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 343-45.
260. 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988).
261. Id. at 1098-99. The indictment charged that the fraud of the defendant Rubin
involved $51 million obtained from two public offerings of securities and bank loans. Id. at
1098. One of the primary issues at trial concerned the revenues of the corporations. Id.
According to the financial records, the company had an account at Barclay's Bank, on Grand
Cayman Island, containing $8 million in profits from the group air charter operations. Id.
The subpoena requested information regarding the $8 million. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1098.
264. Id. at 1099.
265. Id. The district court held that the subpoena was oppressive and unreasonable. Id. at
1100. The court reasoned that if the manager produced the banking records for those accounts
without waivers, he would be subject to criminal sanctions in the Cayman Islands. Id.
Further, the defendant could have, himself, obtained the information requested. Id.
266. Id. at 1100.
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In reviewing the subpoena that sought information from a for-
eign jurisdiction with banking secrecy laws, the Eighth Circuit explic-
itly adopted the Restatement (Second) factor analysis.267 The court
distinctly stated that a major factor to consider was whether the gov-
ernment was seeking bank records of parties, targets of grand jury
criminal investigations, or nonparties.2 68 After analyzing the compet-
ing interests, the court found that the Cayman Islands' interest in pre-
serving the right of privacy that is incorporated in its bank secrecy
laws is greater than the interests of the United States.269
The importance of considering whether foreign law actually pro-
hibits disclosure was demonstrated in two cases in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: State of Ohio v. Andersen 
270
and In re Westinghouse.27' Although both cases involved discovery
orders directed at actual defendants, and not neutral parties, the
court's emphasis upon the position of foreign law was significant. In
both of these cases, the discovery order requested information from
corporations operating abroad.272 The parties in both cases refused to
comply, claiming that foreign law prohibited disclosure.273 As a deci-
sive factor, the Tenth Circuit applied the "proof of foreign law viola-
tion" standard to the facts of each case, and yet, the court reached
different conclusions in each case.
In Andersen, the court enforced the subpoena because the
defendant failed to supply the specific statute in Swiss law that pro-
hibited the disclosure.274 It found that the defendant acted in bad
faith by delaying the action, and by failing to determine whether
Swiss law did, in fact, apply.275
The defendant in Westinghouse, on the other hand, made an ade-
quate showing of foreign law and, therefore, was not compelled to
comply with the production order.276 The court, using a factor analy-
sis, determined that the interests of the parties were equal.277 How-
267. Id. at 1101.
268. Id. at 1102.
269. Id. The court specifically stated: "We are persuaded that if [the manager] were
required to testify absent account waivers, the hardship to him would be great. He would be
subject to criminal penalties which include a fine and incarceration." Id.
270. 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
271. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
272. Andersen, 570 F.2d at 1372; Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 994.
273. Id.
274. Andersen, 570 F.2d at 1374.
275. Id. at 1376. The court stated concerning Andersen's delay in investigating the
applicability of Swiss law: "The record before us shows both flagrant bad faith and callous
disregard." Id
276. Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 996.
277. Id. at 998-99.
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ever, because the defendant in Westinghouse demonstrated that
disclosure would violate Canadian law, and that he had used good
faith efforts to comply with the subpoena, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court's sanctions for noncompliance.278
The significance of these Tenth Circuit cases, especially with
regard to the showing of probable foreign law violations, is that they
followed the reasoning of the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.
In questioning the validity of the "probable foreign law violation"
defense, the court established that in foreign compulsion cases, some
form of foreign law analysis must be undertaken.
In the midst of these concerns, In re Sealed was decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.279
Although the court found it unnecessary to consider whether a court
may ever order action in violation of foreign law, it succinctly focused
upon the international ramifications of ordering such an action.28 °
Specifically, while discussing the issue of comity, the court stated,
"We have little doubt.., that our government and our people would
be affronted if a foreign court tried to compel someone to violate our
laws within our borders."
28'
Under a due process analysis, the In re Sealed court, while briefly
considering the competing national and foreign interests, placed par-
ticular emphasis upon the position of the bank as a nonparty wit-
ness.282 Noting that the government conceded that it would be
impossible for the bank to comply with the contempt order without
violating the laws of the foreign country, the court cautioned: "[I]t
causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law should
order a violation of law .... "283 Finally, it concluded that although
the grand jury's investigation may be significantly hampered, under
the facts of this case, it could not uphold the contempt order against
the bank.2"4 Thus, after establishing that foreign law did in fact pro-
hibit disclosure, the court found that the interest in maintaining com-
ity among the nations outweighed national interests.
As this analysis demonstrates, there is no uniform approach to
reconcile the divergent interests at stake. Although many of the cases
seem to apply the same underlying reasoning, the methods under-
278. Id. at 996, 999.
279. 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987). For discussion of the
facts of the case, see supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
280. Id. at 498.
281. Id. at 498-99.
282. Id. at 498.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 499.
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taken to analyze this reasoning are significantly different. Neither the
Societe Internationale good faith test, nor the Restatement factor
analysis, is used consistently among the federal appellate courts.
Rather, most courts apply the various elements of each standard, for-
mulating their own ad hoc criteria. This inconsistency places the non-
party bank in a fundamentally unfair position. It further permits a
court to arbitrarily establish a standard that may not acknowledge the
significant sovereignty interests at stake. A predictable, concise
framework is needed so that international banks operating in the
United States may be aware of their liability when undertaking cer-
tain actions, and so that there will be no threats to a commercial sys-
tem dependent upon notions of sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In response to the various approaches that developed since the
Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1958, an appropriate reconcili-
ation of these methods must be considered before formulating an
acceptable framework of analysis. Immediately following Societe
Internationale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit established a method of analysis with regard to production orders
directed at a nonparty witness. 285 These early cases demonstrated a
unique deference to the foreign interests at stake and the position of
the non-party. Primarily, it viewed this issue as a question of sover-
eignty, better resolved by the executive branch. Hence, it ordered
production only when it determined that the foreign laws were being
used as a shield for criminal activity. In order to reach this determi-
nation, the federal courts undertook an analysis of the foreign law and
the competing interests. This type of foreign law examination is cru-
cial to a fair determination of the issue. Recently, this reasoning was
recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit's "two-step" analysis. 28 6 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit recog-
nized the fundamental difference when the bank is a "neutral source."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
focused its analysis upon a different factor.2 87 It placed primary
emphasis on the national interests of the United States and ignored
both the foreign interests at stake and the position of the bank. The
court based its decisions upon a "good faith" analysis but failed to
define good faith. The reasoning behind the Nova Scotia cases was
285. See supra notes 172-212 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 213-44 and accompanying text.
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that if the bank is operating in the United States, it must abide by the
laws of this jurisdiction, regardless of the foreign interests at stake.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, recognizing
the implications of such reasoning, addressed the issue in dictum.288
As the issuing of a subpoena that seeks documents located in the terri-
tory of another state has international ramifications, a court analyzing
the issue must give a great deal of consideration to the foreign
interest.
The framework proposed in this Comment involves a three part
analysis. The primary determination for any court faced with a juris-
dictional conflict should be whether disclosure of the requested infor-
mation would actually constitute a violation of the foreign law. This
requires an in-depth examination of the foreign statute at issue. Under
this type of examination, the interests of the sovereign necessarily will
be considered.
Assuming that disclosure would violate the foreign statute and
subject the nonparty witness to criminal liability in the foreign coun-
try, the second factor entails an analysis of the individual interests of
each nation, and more importantly, the hardship upon the nonparty
witness. At this point, the court should determine the purpose behind
the country's non-disclosure law and any responses from the govern-
ment. If the court determines that the interesets of the United States
are significantly greater, compulsion should be required. If the court
concludes that the competing interests are equally important, how-
ever, it can proceed to the third step. The third step places the burden
on the government to establish that the bank acted in bad faith by not
complying with the subpoena. If the government fails to prove bad
faith, compulsion should not be required.
Assuming that the court determines that there is no violation of
foreign law, it has two choices. It can simply compel production, as
there is no valid defense for not complying with the subpoena, or it
can take cognizance of this fact and continue to analyze the compet-
ing interests in light of the nonviolation. The latter choice would be
in accordance to the concept of international comity.
This analysis will greatly reduce due process concerns. The bank
will not be placed in the fundamentally unfair position of having to
choose which law to follow, as the result of a standard that is arbitrar-
ily applied. In addition, sovereignty concerns are addressed, since
every subpoena for the production of documents located in a foreign
country would be based upon an examination of the foreign law. In
288. See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
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light of the important interests at stake, this analysis should only be
undertaken when the bank is a nonparty witness and there are no
bilateral agreements between the countries for the production of evi-
dence. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the courts of the
United States has come to the forefront as an issue of international
relations. As no consistent method of exercising such jurisdiction has
been established, foreign countries have protested vigorously against
discovery attempts in their territory. A viable standard must be
developed in order to afford international banking a more stable base
of operations in the United States. If the United States wishes to
remain at the center of world commercial activity, the courts may
have to exercise restraint in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
SILVIA B. PIRERA-VN ZQUEZ
